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⋆
Abstract. In this paper we discuss the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP)
in relation to post-quantum cryptography. We review the relationship
between HSP and other computational problems discuss an optimal so-
lution method, and review the known results about the quantum com-
plexity of HSP. We also overview some platforms for group-based cryp-
tosystems. Notably, efficient algorithms for solving HSP in the proposed
infinite group platforms are not yet known.
Keywords: Hidden Subgroup Problem, Quantum Computation, Post-Quantum
Cryptography, Group-based Cryptography
1 Introduction
In August 2015 the National Security Agency (NSA) announced plans to upgrade
security standards; the goal is to replace all deployed cryptographic protocols
with quantum secure protocols. This transition requires a new security standard
to be accepted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Proposals for quantum secure cryptosystems and protocols have been submitted
for the standardization process. There are six main primitives currently pro-
posed to be quantum-safe: (1) lattice-based (2) code-based (3) isogeny-based (4)
multivariate-based (5) hash-based, and (6) group-based cryptographic schemes.
One goal of cryptography, as it relates to complexity theory, is to analyze the
complexity assumptions used as the basis for various cryptographic protocols and
schemes. A central question is determining how to generate intractible instances
of these problems upon which to implement an actual cryptographic scheme.
The candidates for these instances must be platforms in which the hardness
assumption is still reasonable. Determining if these group-based cryptographic
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schemes are quantum-safe begins with determining the groups in which these
hardness assumptions are invalid in the quantum setting.
In what follows we address the quantum complexity of the Hidden Subgroup
Problem (HSP) to determine the groups in which the hardness assumption still
stands. The Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) asks the following: given a descrip-
tion of a group G and a function f : G→ X for some finite set X is guaranteed
to be strictly H-periodic, i.e. constant and distinct on left (resp. right) cosets of
a subgroup H ≤ G, find a generating set for H. It is important to note that
Simon’s problem of computing a XOR-mask, Shor’s algorithm for factoring and
finding the discrete log, Boneh’s algorithm for finding a hidden linear function,
and Kitaev’s algorithm for the abelian stabilizer problem are all special cases
of HSP. Therefore, the HSP is directly related to problems such as breaking
one-time pad, discrete logarithm problem, graph isomorphism problem (which
is now known to be in quali-polynomial), lattice-based problems, the problem
for factoring for RSA.
The classical complexity of HSP is known [1]: Suppose that G has a set H
of N subgroups, such that H1 ∩H2 ∩ . . . ∩HH = eG. Then a classical computer
must make Ω(
√
N) queries to solve the HSP. The classical cases in which HSP
is easy are the cases in which G has only a polynomial number of subgroups,
allowing brute-force for the function f on all subgroups.
We provide a survey of results regarding the complexity of quantum algo-
rithms for solving HSP in various group platforms. We also provide information
on the relationship between HSP and other computational problems. These re-
sults provide insight into potential platforms for quantum safe cryptography,
when the underlying hard problem is reducible to HSP.
2 Group-based Cryptography
Group-based cryptography could be shown to be post-quantum if the underlying
security problem is NP-complete or unsolvable; firstly, we need to analyze the
problem’s equivalence to HSP, then analyze the applicability of Grover’s search
problem. Cryptanalysis based on a reduction to solving HSP creates some ob-
stacles as the groups under consideration below are mostly infinite and do not
have an efficient algorithm for HSP. In the following cryptosystems a connection
to HSP can assist in the analysis of security.
For example in [2] a practical cryptanalysis of WalnutDSA was proposed,
a post-quantum cryptosystem using the conjugacy search problem (CSP) over
braid groups that was submitted to the NIST competition in 2017 [3]. It has been
argued since the braid group does not contain any non-trivial finite subgroups,
there does not seem to be any viable way to connect CSP with HSP. It has been
shown there is no reduction connection between the CSP and HSP, [4,5]. As for
analysis via Grover’s algorithm [6], it has been mentioned that a majority of the
time for signature verification in WalnutDSA is repeated E-Multiplications.
There are alternative group-theoretic problems and classes of groups which
have been proposed for post-quantum cryptography. For example, the first proto-
cryptosystem based on groups was proposed byWagner-Magyarik in [7] for which
the word choice problem was hard. Later on Flores-Kahrobaei-Koberda proposed
right-angled Artin groups for various other cryptographic protocols [8], [9]. Eick
and Kahrobaei proposed Polycyclic groups, using the Conjugacy Search Prob-
lem [10] for cryptography. Later on Gryak-Kahrobaei wrote a survey and pro-
posed other group-theoretic problems for consideration using polycyclic groups
[11]. Kahrobaei-Koupparis [12] proposed a post-quantum digital signature using
polycyclic groups. Kahrobaei-Khan proposed a public-key cryptosystem using
polycyclic groups [13]. Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Koupparis-Shpilrain proposed the use
of a semigroup of matrices with a semidirect product structure [14].
Thompson groups have been considered by Shpilrain-Ushakov based on the
Decomposition Search Problem [15]. Hyperbolic groups have been proposed by
Chatterji-Kahrobaei-Lu using properties of subgroup distortion and the Geodesic
Length Problem [16]. Free metabelian groups have been proposed based on the
Subgroup Membership Search Problem by Shpilrain-Zapata [17]. Kahrobaei-
Shpilirain proposed Free nilpotent p-groups for a semidirect product public key
cryptosystem [18]. Linear groups were proposed by Baumslag-Fine-Xu [19]. Grig-
orchuk groups, have been proposed by [20]. Groups of matrices, for a Homomor-
phic Encryption scheme were proposed by Grigoriev-Ponomarenko [21].
3 Relation of HSP to Other Computational Problems
Many computational problems are special cases of the HSP; an efficient algo-
rithm for HSP over a certain group implies an efficient algorithm for some other
computational problem. It is important to note that one method of determin-
ing an efficient quantum solution to a hard problem consists of reducing the
problem to an instance of HSP over a group with a known efficient solution.
This consists of determining the appropriate group G, the subgroup H and the
strongly H-periodic function f . For example, Simon’s problem can be viewed as
an instantiation of HSP over G = Zn2 with a subgroup H of order 2. Duetsch’s
algorithm solves a variant of HSP where H is either {0} (f is balanced) or Z2
(f is constant). Shor’s algorithm solves period finding as a special case of HSP,
allowing for an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring and discrete log.
The graph automorphism (resp. isomorphism) problem can also be framed
as an instance of HSP. To solve graph automorphism we consider HSP in the
symmetric group on n letters, G = Sn, any function f which hides the trivial
subgroup is an automorphism. Analogously the graph isomorphism problem is
an instance of HSP over the wreath product G = Sn ≀ S2 [22]. Also, solutions to
HSP can solve the abelian stabilizer problem; when G is acting on a finite set X
and where StG(x) is the stabilizer of x we have that fx : G→ X can be defined
such that g 7→ g(x) is strongly StG(x)-periodic.
A solution to a particular instance of HSP is a solution to the hidden linear
functions [23]; if g is a permutation of ZN and h : Z × Z → ZN is such that
x, y 7→ x + ay mod N , we have f = g ◦ h hiding 〈(−a, 1)〉. Additionally, self-
shift-equivalent polynomials can be framed as an instance of HSP, in this case
Grigoriev shows how to compute the hidden subgroup [24].
An efficient solution to HSP would imply an efficient solution to certain lattice
problems. Specifically, the g(n)-Unique Shortest Vector Problem (USVP) is NP-
hard for g(n) = O(1), and has a polynomial time classical solution when g(n) is
large. The dihedral HSP, based on standard-method (found below) can be used
to solve poly(n)-USVP [25]. HSP over the symmetric and dihedral groups are
highly motivated open questions in post-quantum group-based cryptography.
Another, related, computational problem is the Hidden Shift Problem, which
has been proposed as a basis for post-quantum cryptography in symmetric cryp-
tosystems that are quantum-CPA secure [26]. Other than the use of a generaliza-
tion of Simon’s algorithm, and Kuperberg’s algorithm discussed above, very little
is known about the Hidden Shift Problem. Clearly this problem is closely related
to HSP as some solutions coincide. It is important to note that constructions
baed on this Hidden Shift problem have also remained quantum secure.
4 Solution Methods
The standard method of solving HSP over G performs the following steps. First,
the algorithm queries the H-periodic function f in superposition and discards
the register which holds the output. This leaves the first register entangled in
a hidden subgroup state, a superposition of coset representatives for some left
traversal K ⊂ G. Following this, the state can be sampled using post-processing
techniques to determine H . In the following we have |gH〉 = |H |−1/2 ∑h∈H |gh〉
as the coset state. This approach reduces the problem to a problem of quantum
mechanics: how to distinguish the members of an ensemble of quantum hidden
subgroup states.
|G|1/2
∑
g∈G
|g, 0〉 7→ |G|1/2
∑
g∈G
|g, f(g)〉 7→ ρH = |H ||G|−1
∑
g∈K
|gH〉〈gH |
How do we measure the state? The problem of distinguishing these quantum
states has some proposed solutions. Most namely, the often optimal solution en-
titled Pretty Good Measurement (PGM) can be used. An obstacle to performing
PGM is the lack of an efficient QTF/CFT in the underlying group. For these
instances we know of no efficient quantum algorithm for solving HSP.
5 Results
Finite Abelian and Finite Near-Abelian. The infamous quantum algorithms of
Simon and Shor provide quantum solutions to HSP in the abelian cases where
G = (Z/2)n and G = Z respectively. Shor’s algorithm extends to the gen-
eral abelian case as well, providing a polynomial time quantum algorithms with
bounded error [27–29]. The probability of success can be improved to 1 when G is
abelian of smooth order, i.e. if all prime factors of |G| are at most (log |G|)c [30].
In the case that G is nearly abelian, i.e. if the value κ(G) = {∩H≤GN(H)}
where N(H) is the normalizer for H is sufficiently large there are established
computational bounds on HSP. The size of this intersection relative to the group
is a measure of the abelianness of G. Gavinsky [31] gave results to show that an
efficient algorithm exists when [G : κ(G)] = poly(log |G|).
The HSP can be solved in polynomial time by a quantum algorithm to find
hidden normal subgroups of solvable groups and permutation groups, finding
hidden subgroups of groups with small commutator subgroup and of groups
admitting an elementary Abelian normal 2-subgroup of small index or with cyclic
factor group [32]. Subexponential algorithms for HSP in any solvable group have
been given by Friedl et al. [33].
When G is a known finite abelian group with a subgroupH ≤ G, given black-
box access to the H-hiding function f , we know that a quantum computer can
uniquely and completely determine f in poly log(|G|) time and query complexity.
When G is nearly abelian, or built from abelian parts, one can leverage this fact
to obtain an efficient algorithm for HSP.
Finite, Non-Abelian. The finite non-abelian case of HSP is more elusive. Shor’s
algorithm extends to any group G when H is normal if quantum fourier trans-
form (QFT) can be efficiently computed over the group [34]. The algorithm also
extends to when H has few conjugates, requiring the quantum character trans-
form (QCT) over the group algebra C[G] [35]. This variation is not applicable
when H has many conjugates, as in some of the following cases. Alternatively,
when H is normal in G, a black-box group, generators forH can be found in time
polynomial in the input size + v(G) [32] without requiring an efficient QFT over
G.Additionally, the quantum computation of the discrete log in semi-groups [36]
is an instance of HSP.
When the group G is the (discrete) Heisenberg group it is sufficient to be
able to distinguish cyclic subgroups of order p, Ha,b. Thus, finding an arbitrary
H reduces to determining two parameters a, b, given the coset state produced by
the standard method using f which hides Ha,b. This can be efficiently computed
with an overall success probability close to 12 .
In a more difficult case we consider instances of HSP in the dihedral group
of order 2N , DN where the function f hides H of order 2. In this case H , a
hidden reflection, has many conjugates in G and the QCT based solution is not
applicable. Kuperberg stated that finding an arbitrary hidden subgroup H of
DN reduces to finding the slope of a hidden reflection and provides a quantum
algorithm with both time and query complexity of 2O(
√
logN), applicable to DN
for all values of N but achieving an even tighter complexity bound for specific
smooth values of N [37] . Kuperberg’s algorithm also provides a solution to the
hidden shift problem in an arbitrary finitely generated abelian group G. Regev
improved upon the bounds of Kuperberg’s original algorithm providing a polyno-
mial space variation to the original superpolynomial space algorithm, which still
achieves subexponential complexity [38]. Regev showed that an efficient solution
to the dihedral HSP implies a quantum solution to lattice problems [25].
When G is a type of wreath product Wn = Z
n
2 ≀ Z2, Roetteler et al. [39]
provide a positive result for finding an efficient solution to the non-abelian HSP
within Wn. This result is due to the existence of an efficient non-abelian QFT in
Wn. Wreath product groups are in turn a subset of semi-direct product groups.
When G is (one of some groups that are) a semidirect product of abelian groups,
alternative efficient algorithms have been proposed. The polycyclic HSP has been
addressed for Zpk ⋊Z2 for fixed prime power p
k [40], Zq ⋉Zp with q|(p− 1) and
q = ppolylog(p) , certain affine groups [41], Z
m
pr ⋊ Zp [42], with p ∈ P, Zpr ⋊ Zqs
where pr/q = poly(log p2 where p, q ∈ P and r, s ∈ N [43], and ZN ⋊ Zqs where
N has a special prime factorization [44].
In general, when G is a group of finite order the HSP problem has quantum
query complexity of poly(log |G|) as shown by Ettinger, Høyer and Knill [45]; for
any groupG, O(log |G|) queries provides sufficient statistical information to solve
HSP. This result provides no guarantees on computational complexity. The real
problem is determining how to implement the queries efficiently, as well as how
to control the amount of postprocessing required by the algorithm. In the case
of the dihedral group, an algorithm with the lower bound on query complexity
has been constructed, but the postprocessing required is exponential. In many
cases the inefficiency of a proposed quantum algorithm is primarily due to the
inefficiency of the required quantum measurement or post-processing within the
group.
Infinite. What seems to be an obstacle for infinite groups is that the quan-
tum computer should assume the following state: |G〉 = |G|−1/2 ∑g∈G |g〉. The
meaning of this is clear for finite groups. The abelian infinite HSP was clearly
first considered with Shor’s algorithm, over Z. In [46], infinite-dimensional HSP
has been mentioned, particularly for infinite abelian groups ZN . Additionally,
HSP has been defined and considered for infinite abelian groups of the form
R
k ×Zl× (R/Z)s×H for some finite group H [47]. Other than the cases of ZN ,
RN, TN , and combinations of these in which an efficient algorithm exists, the
infinite and continuous HSP has not been addressed within the literature for the
non-abelian case.
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